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SYMPOSIUM
CAN GOD AND CAESAR COEXIST?
BALANCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
BY
ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J.t
Any author of a book would feel honored to have three
knowledgeable scholars write extensive comments on his book. I
feel deeply honored and grateful for the perceptive articles
collected here. Indeed the thought occurred to. me that these
three wonderful articles should be added to any edition or
editions of a book on religious freedom!
Professor Christopher Borgen ingeniously put together this
trilogy of articles which explore in depth the possibility of making
the right to religious freedom somehow enforceable at the
regional and/or world level. His trenchant comments explore the
difficulties inherent in enforcing the religious freedom made
available to everyone in several United Nations documents. This
right is particularly spelled out in the 1981 United Nations
Declaration on Religious Freedom. Professor Borgen raises
penetrating questions about the feasibility of any juridical body-
especially one with global jurisdiction-in elucidating and
enforcing the right to religious freedom which has been affirmed
and reaffirmed in the last fifty years in every human rights
covenant promulgated by the United Nations.
Professor Borgen raises almost every question about the
feasibility of juridical machinery to enforce religious freedom. He
notes the vast differences between the appearances and
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understanding of religious freedom in the west, the Muslim
world, and Asia. But he also concedes the intolerance and even
persecution of some religious dissidents as an evil contrary to
world law that needs and deserves a remedy. His skepticism
about a court-oriented solution is well taken but one can raise
the question of whether Professor Borgen gives full consideration
to the instances in national and international law where courts
have proclaimed a new and bold vision which, against the
greatest odds, has prevailed and eventually changed the way in
which the world thinks about a particular topic.
The rapid rise in opposition to all of the forms of torture is an
example of how courts, legislatures, and world opinion have
coalesced to condemn and punish torture in all of its
manifestations.
The right to religious freedom is different from every other
right proclaimed in international law over the last five decades.
Rights are generally based on concepts of human dignity that go
back to Magna Carta or at least the rights proclaimed during the
Enlightenment in Europe. The right to religious freedom is very
new on the world scene. It is probably more difficult to enforce
than the more traditional rights such as freedom of speech and
freedom of the press.
Professor Borgen rightly raises the question of the feasibility
and enforceability of international court decrees related to
religious freedom. That of course is one of the major issues
today. It is the central issue why members of the United Nations
in 1981 settled on a mere declaration on religious freedom and
not an enforceable covenant.
Underlying all of the endless discussion is a deep desire on
the part of almost everyone to protect and enhance religious
freedom whenever and wherever that is possible. That is the
aspiration of political and religious leaders almost everywhere in
the world. Professor Borgen asserts that the formal recognition
of the right to religious freedom that has been agreed to by all
the nations may "take time ... to flower into consistent state
practice." He adds that "while such flowering can be encouraged
it cannot be rushed."
The defenders of religious freedom for everyone in the world
will properly ask whether all of the other human rights now
guaranteed by world law were "rushed." The moral aspirations
of one generation sometimes become the legal rights of the next
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generation. The right to religious freedom may well be on the
brink of the becoming guaranteed by world law.
Professor Mark W. Janis has become a well-known and
respected advocate of international human rights-especially the
right of religious freedom. His misgivings about the workability
of a world court on religious freedom are entitled to deep respect.
He points out that belief in religion and the sovereign state are
"two of the strongest human emotional attachments." Can
international law, which Professor Janis calls the "Cinderella of
the tale," rise up to curb the claims of religious faith or the state?
Professor Janis perceptively points out that there are now
eighteen functioning international courts or tribunals. He
wonders whether a nineteenth court devoted to religious freedom
could be useful or effective. Professor Janis correctly points out
that the proposed international court on religious freedom would
have problems to resolve that are more complex than any of the
policies related to human rights of all of the other international
tribunals. He notes that it seems highly unlikely that countries
like Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and China would submit
disputes about the practice of religion or religious tolerance to a
panel of international judges or arbitrators.
The skepticism of Professor Janis about the feasibility of a
world juridical body with jurisdiction over religious freedom is
well taken. But is there any other proposal that might bring
relief to non-Muslims in Muslim countries or non-believers in
Christian or post-Christian nations? He points out that even the
highly-developed European Court of Human Rights seems to be
very timid in its resolution of disputes related to religious
freedom in Europe.
Professor Janis raises excellent points about the frailty of
international law as an instrument of justice in the world. But
one can wonder whether he undervalues, for example, the
issuance of the six United Nations committees that monitor
compliance of the vast majority of the nations of the Earth that
have subscribed to the six major human rights treaties approved
by the United Nations.
Professor Elizabeth Defeis has written a thorough and
cogent analysis of religious freedom as defined by the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"). This tribunal, which is
regarded as the most sophisticated and developed human rights
court in the world, has not advanced, in any impressive way,
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priorities related to religious freedom. Professor Defeis
attributes this in part to the increasing secularization of Europe.
She asserts that the ECHR has found secularism to be consistent
with values underlying the European Convention on Human
Rights.
Some may feel that this generalization is too broad. But it is
clear that the ECHR has tended to extend a wide margin of
appreciation to infringements on religious freedom in various
countries. In Turkey, for example, the ECHR allowed that very
secular nation to expel a medical student because as a woman
and a Muslim she insisted on wearing the scarf as a religious
headdress.
The sole dissent in the case, filed by Judge Francoise
Tulkens of Belgium, objected to the ban on headscarves which
she called a violation of the rights of women and a form of
paternalism.
The ban on headdresses by the European court was
vigorously protested by Human Rights Watch, an American
based human rights nongovernmental organization. It seems
safe to predict that the European Court of Human Rights and
other tribunals around the world will be re-litigating the
question of the wearing of the headscarf for religious purposes.
Over 1,000 women in Turkey and elsewhere have filed
applications to reverse the ban by the ECHR. The issue will
continue to be raised by Muslims and by women. It is now a
question filled with meaning in the 48 Islamic nations, and
women and others are insisting on full equality for religious
convictions.
Professor Defeis also describes the negative attitudes which
France and other nations have toward religious "cults."
Professor Defeis is sympathetic to those who complain that
their religious freedom has been infringed but she wonders
whether the international court on religious freedom proposed by
some is the optimum method to resolve disputes concerning
religious liberty in Europe. She points to the flexibility of the
court on non-religious issues which, she asserts, has made it "the
most effective court for the protection of human rights."
None of the three commentators on my book desires to
narrow the reaches of religious freedom. Realistically they
wonder about the workability or even the possibility of having a
commission or tribunal issuing rulings on the way by which
[Vol. 45:5
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international law has called for the enlargement of the right of
freedom of worship.
One very important issue in the whole area of religious
freedom was mentioned but not elaborated in my book. This is
the notion of freedom of conscience. It is really incredible that in
some of the international covenants on human rights-and
especially in the U.N. Declaration on Religious Freedom-the
concept of the supremacy of the voice of conscience is asserted.
Elaboration of this expansive notion is not prominent in the
escalating literature on the contours of religious freedom. Some
commentators assert the obvious that no one's claim to be
following their conscience can justify murder or any other serious
crime.
The law with respect to those who are conscientiously
opposed to participating in all forms of warfare has not been
particularly generous in recognizing that claim. But it is possible
that conscientious objectors may become more assertive and
aggressive and that their claim will be recognized in national and
international law.
But it is astonishing that in all of the international research
about religious freedom, the right of a person to follow conscience
is asserted continuously and vigorously. The right to follow one's
conscience is given the same status as the right to assert that a
person is religious or irreligious.
Could the right to follow one's conscience grow into a broad
and widely recognized claim under international law? The claim
may sound fanciful but the right to follow one's conscience is
asserted vigorously and repeatedly in most of the declarations
and covenants on human rights agreed to by the international
community over the last fifty years.
The three thoughtful articles on my book reflect the
implications of the worldwide claims by those who have religious
faith and those who do not. Countless observers are
understandably still afraid of religion because of the wars and
persecutions started at the instigation of religious groups
through the centuries. At the same time there is a profound,
worldwide empathy for those who, because of their deepest
convictions and their conscience, want to fulfill in their lives
what they conceive to be the will of God.
The endless struggles between God and Caesar will probably
go on in some form until the end of time. It is the solemn duty of
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those with faith and those without faith to make it possible for
every human being to claim the rights that he or she feels are the
dictates of his or her conscience. That is the lesson of the United
Nations, the teaching of international law, and the aspiration of
every person with or without religious faith.
